Tenue est mendacium
Rethinking Fakes and Authorship in Classical,
Late Antique & Early Christian Works

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in Classical, Late Antique & Early Christian Works

edited by

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and

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AD EMERITUM ANTONIUM GUZMANEM

Gratias tibi agimus, magister qui scientia tua nos aluisti.
Natus in Gaditana terra per multos et frugiferos annos
in Academia Complutensi doctrinam tradidisti,
doctus inter doctos, tuorum tutor, consili plenus,
scaenae Graecae antiquae studiosus. Nunc tibi
tempus est dulci otio perfruendi. Ita di faciant!

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tenue est mendacium
Introduction[*]

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Various of life's moments, from schoolboy's desk[1] to public speech,[2] are worthy of Aesop. So is a most intimate moment, as we hear it about the "martyr of philosophy,"[3] when he loosens the chain and rubs the ankle.[4] In Germany nowadays, when the σπουδαῖον of the late virus mixes with the (σπουδο)γέλοιον of the heated discussion about the "gender-starlet" (*Gendersternchen*),[5] it seems especially worth looking at Socrates's fable in which the pleasurable (ἡδύ) and the painful (λυπηρόν) – both are neuter, fortunately! – get fastened together at their heads. Experts and forgers live in "symbiotic relationship,"[6] and so do *falsum* and *verum* and disinformation and information: so, let's say, dis*information.

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[1] Quint. inst. or. 1. 9. 2, Theo progymn. p. 75, 32 Spengel, et al.; Aesop is still alive in German competence-addicted didactics: Winkler 2012.

[2] Aesop on Samus (Arist. Rhet. 2. 20 1393ᵇ22 ~ fr. 573 Rose), Stesichorus in Himera (Aesop. fab. 269a Perry), Demosthenes and Demades in Athens ({Plut.} decem vit. or., mor. 848A p. 38, 14 Mau; fab. 63 Perry); Alexis Tsipras at the New Year's Reception of the German *Die Linken*: see W. Lepenies in *Die Welt*, 3.7.2015, p. 3 (https://www.welt.de/print/welt_kompakt/debatte/article143478018/Raubgierige-Ameisen.html).

[3] The expression is used by, e.g., Zeller, Hirzel, Jaspers, Wehrli and many others.

[4] Plat. Phaed. 60b1–c7.

[5] The *Gendersternchen*, spoken with a somewhat ugly stop before *in(nen), as, e.g., Philolog*innen, makes, as argued by its supporters, visible (and audible) the diverse … reality "*beyond a binary … model*" ("jenseits eines binären … Modells": https://www.uni-bielefeld..de/verwaltung/refkom/gendern/richtlinien/; vis. 08-06-21, my italics): that's what matters here.

[6] Momigliano, *infra*, referring to Grafton 1990.

Every *falsum*[7] participates in two worlds: that of disinformation, because a false relation is created between thing and non-author and thus also between thing and author and thing and recipient. Philology, safer sister of investigative journalism in the "Infodemic,"[8] aims to eliminate *such* disinformation. Here, philology and investigation, in an antitypical way to one of the most frequent motives of counterfeiters, insist on the acknowledgment of gaps, i.e. *non*information.[9] Apropos of gaps: *lacunae* are, as every reader of *exemplaria* (not only) *manu scripta* knows, just as ubiquitous as Aesop and represent by far the larger subset in the field of knowledge. Jonathan Klawans, in his competent review of our last volume,[10] appropriately noted that "readers are provided with no further information about this research group."[11] No secrets at all: Javier Martínez invites again (for the third time in the Barkhuis, καλοὶ παρὰ καλόν!) a loose circle of συμφιλολο-γοῦντες[12] to λογόδειπνον. "Why these specific authors?" 'Cause, lector benevole, they were about to bring an eranos (hopefully) not too despicable.[13] "Why this given range of subjects?" Well, fakes and forgeries are *ingentia rura*, we *exiguum colimus*. And Martínez is more (τῆς βίβλου) πατήρ than δεσπότης (by the way, we know how to defend, like Pamphile!): he knows that πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ᾽ ἀνιηρὸν ἔφυ. And this book, after all, "in an age of 'work': that is to say, of haste, of unseemly and immoderate hurry-scurry,"[14] indulges in the luxury of

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[7] I use *fake* and *forgery* "and the like" (Eco 1992, 607) "in the loose but sufficiently clear sense which generally attaches to them" (Javier Martínez).

[8] Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus' speech at the Munich Security Conference, 15.2.20: https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/munich-security-conference (vis. 13.6. 21).

[9] Fakes are often seen "expanding and filling in … gaps" (cf. John Henderson, *infra*, and Mithradates's *praefatio*, *infra*), philology means detecting and displaying gaps: the latter, paradoxically, is informative (*aut nulli commentarii* …), the former dis*informative (*aut, quod peius est, falsi*: Sen. contr. 1 praef. 11): *aliter quam debet notum* is detrimental, *ignotum* is neutral, at least.

[10] Guzmán / Martínez (eds.) 2018; J. K., BMCR 2019.08.32; the review, by the way, has a gap in its title.

[11] As for the group, see https://falsarios.grupos.uniovi.es/ and https://www.falsarios.com. This volume is as well part of a series of publications edited by our Research Group since 2012. It compiles research work from scholars who have been invited to contribute without any restrictions imposed: in collecting their contributions we aim only to display some of the many different avenues available for exploring the broader phenomenon of fakes and forgeries.

[12] The beautiful word may first have been coined by Cicero epist. 16. 21. 8.

[13] "I did indeed find much of interest" (J. Klawans, BMCR 2019.08.32). John Henderson, Kostas Kapparis, Mikel Labiano, Javier Martínez of course, Heinz-Günther Nesselrath, and myself are "repeat contributors," and the choice for this introduction fell on me, as "intensive contributor."

[14] F. Nietzsche, Morgenröthe (1886), Vorrede. 5., transl. Kennedy 1911, 8–9.

being a *Lesebuch*, to be read during some idle, philological hour, conveying that awakening feeling of, if *desultoria*, *scientia*.

The two worlds of the *falsum*, then. Dis*information is a dialectical tool: every message about an object y to a reader z by a counterfeiter x contains *nolens* (*volens*?) *in*formation about the profile of x[15] – and z: "a fake or a forgery is a theatrical performance, in some sense, … it has a keen sense of its audience."[16] And even more: Fakes "could also be regarded as 'creative supplements' that might inform our approach to canonical texts,"[17] their analysis contributes to the "critical history of … reception."[18] Analysis of the fakes (not: fake-analysis) brings us more precisely to the consciousness of just how the *verum* was actually "inimitable" and every fake inevitably *neglegentius*:[19] through the very fakes the *vera* are recognized as "objects so complex in material and form that no attempt to reproduce them can duplicate all the characteristics acknowledged as essential."[20]

Information means relation. It becomes "truth"[21] with the true relation of all participants involved (in this sense it is not applicable that "fake texts" can generate "genuine experience," at least not in the Platonic sense).[22] After all, it's about *communication*. And of course, with classical philology in mind: *mass* communication. *hem.* If this sounds surprising when objects concern "small disciplines,"[23] look at the definition: mass communication happens, where "statements are communicated publicly … through technical means of dissemination …

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[15] "A literary forgery reveals more about the times it is produced in than about the past it pretends to be part of" (Ruthven 2001, 15); "chronological fictions are thus to be considered valuable cultural evidence of the way Imperial audiences understood their recent past" (Peirano 2012, 206); "a valuable source of evidence for understanding cultural expectations related to a genre or to the physical presence of a text" (Higbie 2017, 13), et al.; cf. also the "abductive textual analysis" by Lacalle (1992).

[16] Martínez 2011, 18.

[17] Martínez 2018a, 404, referring to Peirano 2012.

[18] Ruthven 2001, 15.

[19] Cf. Cic. Att. 3. 12. 2.

[20] Eco 1992, 609; "much of the material … was created to deceive and deceive it did, but we can profit from the lessons to be learned … to see what the qualities of a great original work of art are …": Sachs 1973, cit. by Higbie 2017, 4.

[21] For the term, cf. ψευδεῖς λόγοι D.H. Din. 1. 12 R.–U., verae *comoediae* (sc. *Plauti*: Gell. NA 3, 3 pr. 1), vera *oratio* Gell. 4. 18. 5, et al.

[22] Ruthven 2001, 13.

[23] Archeology, Greek and Latin studies, at many German universities, function within projects and associations of so-called "small subjects": classical philology from *Königswissenschaft* to a small subject ironically recalls Hdt. 1. 5. 4.

indirectly … and one-sided … to a dispersed audience."[24] Schleiermacher was clearly right when he took a "detour via … communication," in order to make the "careful distinction between unconsciously arising mechanical errors, consciously decided and well-intentional interpolations and, finally, malicious falsifications."[25]

Communication science confirms what has been said: every communication is representative of a relationship model.[26] To each "true" meaning – meaning that is of course more "intimisticly" (e.g. lyric poetry) or more "extimisticly" (e.g. science; historiography; epic) and tonally (but not totally) differentiated (factual, pathetic, ironic, satirical, etc.)[27] – belongs a "meeting point," a common field of symbols. Sender and recipient have concluded an information contract, stating that the "stimuli" contained in a complex "container" (which necessarily includes the sender)[28] are *relationally* true. Communication, "context-specific as it is, requires that someone should own and be responsible for every utterance":[29] τὴν κρείττω τὰ συγγράμματα δείξει. *pagina, quod sufficit, loquatur materiam, non loquatur auctorem,*[30] according to communication theory, *non exstat.* Wherever the dimension of (generically most varied, naturally) *responsibility* for what is

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[24] Maletzke 1963, 32, cit. by Khabyuk 2019, 129, et al. (my transl.); for the "dispersed public" cf. Maletzke 1963, 28–30. For our purposes, it seems to me, we do not need to discuss in any detail one specific "communication model"; we might refer, e.g., to Henk Prakke's classic model, which stems from 1968, and is widely used or criticized by communication scientists (depicted, e.g., in Merten 2007, 31 and 57); we deprive it of its reciprocity only.

[25] Cit. by Reulecke 2016, 37 (my transl.).

[26] A "field of communication" ("Kommunikationsfeld") means a "system of relations between the communicator, the message, and the recipient" ("Beziehungssystem zwischen dem Kommunikator, der Aussage und dem Rezipienten"): Khabyuk 2019, 127, referring to Maletzke 1963, 18–19 (my transl.).

[27] Let me put it this way, without further detail: the relative intimacy or "extimacy" of the genres is related, of course, to their original pragmatics, and is much better known to contemporary viewers / listeners / readers than to the modern, e.g., narratologist, who runs the risk of "inattention to the reading" – add: and writing! – "instincts and habits of the ancients themselves" (Whitmarsh 2009, 58).

[28] As well as every interpretation contains the interpreter, every text contains its author, flesh and blood, not a *calamus* (Greg. Mor. In Iob pr. 1, 2): this anthropological fact seems more often misunderstood ("it is language that speaks, not the author": Roland Barthes) than formulated (e.g., Graziosi 2013, 11).

[29] Whitmarsh 2009, 63. This "someone," in a way, is the *genitor* of all that happens to be said (cf. Stemplinger's reference to Leonardo Bruni in: Stemplinger 1912, 2).

[30] Sulp. Sev. vit. Sancti Martini praef. 6.

said should permanently[31] not be revealed to the implied reader,[32] we speak of fakes and forgeries: communication, here, is intentionally prevented from one side, which excludes any form of art (because art *wants* communication). The symbols to be shared between sender and recipient do not have to (and cannot) be strictly identical; a thicker, "more or less appropriate" understanding of the contract is sufficient.[33] The common sign level conveys the "image of the communicator to the recipient,"[34] which – within the most varied forms of expression – must remain "true" in order not to mutilate the previous act of information into disinformation: the "advocacy role"[35] placed by the author in the sign field (*Zeichenfeld*).

Pragmatical contracts, usually, are a matter of course for the intended *hearer* of ancient texts.[36] Kostas Kapparis gives us – curtain-up for the "line up"! – a tasty crumb from his forthcoming edition of {Demosthenes}, sorry: *Apollodorus*, son of Pasion.[37] With his hammering rhetoric, when he deeply mirrors contemporary language development, this somewhat unsightly man[38] was one of the prominent Athenian figures of his time (middle of the fourth century BC), and his impression on heliasts and ecclesiasts was unmistakable. But dusky pathways of tradition incorporated him into *the* speaker: Kapparis castigates the misjudgments incurred by rhetors from the imperial era up to now, if Apollodorus was and is not seen as a classic author *sui iuris*.

The *praefatio* of "Mithridates" (first century AD?), introducing the collection of his own replies to the letters of {Brutus} makes a rare and precious *explicit*

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[31] Cf. Speyer 1971, 14; that "the fictitious truth, sometimes, can afford a higher truth than the historical truth, which often remains superficial" ("Die fiktive Wahrheit kann bisweilen einen höheren Wahrheitsgehalt besitzen als die oft vordergründige geschichtliche Wahrheit") (Speyer 2009, 121 (my transl.); cf. Ar. *poet.* 9 1451b5), seems only be acceptable in the grade the fiction is communicated as such.

[32] The problem of pseudepigraphy in religious texts, too, is increasingly being grasped as *receptive* ("open pseudepigraphy," cf. Frenschkowski 2009 with negative result; Glaser 2009, 289–294: pastoral letters as novel).

[33] Cf. Merten 2007, 67 ("mehr oder weniger angemessenes").

[34] Cf. Merten 2007, 67 ("Bild vom Kommunikator beim Rezipienten").

[35] The term is by Bruce Westley and Malcolm MacLean, cf. Maletzke 1988, 59.

[36] The loss of pragmatics is "a broad field" and plays its role in many of the text subjects discussed in this volume as a kind of "presumption of innocence": an *opusculum Theocriteum* before the pears in the symposium; a *carmen Horatianum* communicated by letter between connoisseurs; a morning class impersonation: but don't let 'em go!

[37] Kapparis 2018 takes a new look at the fake documents in D. 18 (*Cor.*), 21 (*Mid.*), Apollodorus' *Kata Neairas* ({D.} 59) and Aesch. 1 (*Tim.*), and explains them as "educational texts," "where there is no reason to believe that … the ultimate objective was to deceive the reader" (61).

[38] See his "authentification" {D.} 45, 77 (Kapparis, *infra*).

communication contract of a counterfeiter. Kathryn Tempest shows us an author mastering the rhetorical challenge brilliantly ({Brutus'} letters δυσαποκρίτως ἔχουσιν!). We encounter the fascinating and enormously *informative* work of an honest forger, who leaves it to the reader to judge whether "his compositions should stand up to the expectations of the pseudepigraphic enterprise".

With a wink, "Mithridates" refers to the fact that *the* classic model of an explicitly shared *Zeichenfeld* of someone who is certainly not a counterfeiter is represented by the "Method chapter" of Thucydides 1. 22, by which, as I understand it (with many though by no means all), the most possible ἀκρίβεια of the *vis verborum* of the given speeches is promised. In my contribution I ask whether – and for the well-minded: how – the *summa* of Pericles' *encomium Athenarum*, i.e. Thuc. 2. 41, which, as I'll try to argue innovatively,[39] might be understood as the *post* 404 answer to the so called "Nauarchs monument" of Lysandrus, would fairly match this claim.

Implicit common fields of signs are notoriously (even) more precarious and can take on the most varied of shapes. They reveal themselves in many works that, by a scandalously simple-minded past, have been frankly mis*judged: Newer, naturally much more complex, observation recognizes[40] the "harmless presumption," be it of the more rhetorical or more artistic kind, whereby the symbols, leading to an undeceived grasp of the whole, are communicably laid down in the "container" by the author and shared by the intended recipient. Indications of such ironized fields of symbols, accessible at the meeting-point of "player" and "receiver," are, e.g., discursive discrepancy,[41] (stylistic and other, often testimonial)[42] hypertension and/or hypertrophic referentiality.[43] Plato opened up such a "meeting point" via the structural semiosis of the Atlantis myth: The γνωστέον of

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[39] Against a kind of eleventh commandment of Philology: *non nove intelleges textum tuum (nec enim recte intelleges).*

[40] Philological progress, today, occurs via differentiation, i.e., different*iated*ly. But the shoulders of giants – alas! – call for much "climbing competence," indeed (cf. *supra* n. 1).

[41] Cf. the ninth *Epistula Salviani* (CSEL 8, 217), an already topical reference in specialist literature: *sufficere itaque ad excludendam penitus apocryfi stili suspicionem etiam hoc solum poterat, quod superius indicavi, libros neotericae disputationis esse et a praesentis temporis homine divinarum rerum studio atque amore conscriptos; carent enim apocryfa suspicione, qui* agnoscuntur *Timothei apostoli non fuisse.*

[42] *nullum tam impudens mendacium est, ut teste careat* (Plin. NH 8. 82).

[43] {Plato's} *Seventh letter* sounds "more late-platonic than Plato" (Lennartz 2018, 69), {Sallustius'} *Letters* "more Sallustian than Sallust" (cf. Reichetanz 2018), {Sallustius'} *Invective* is "breathtaking" and "(over)written" (Jared Hudson, *infra*), {Cicero's} speech *Oratio pridie quam in exilium iret* "piles on *abundant* phrasing" (John Henderson, *infra*), {Athanasius'} praise of Lucifer's writings "est si exagéré, qu'il éveille le soupçon" (Louis Saltet, cit. by Whiting, *infra*), etc.

the typical Platonic mythopoeia (narrative shift, dimensional paradox,[44] apocryphal testimoniality) provides his "primary audience" with conductive guides. Heinz-Günther Nesselrath, not the second to any Ἀτλαντικοί, will introduce us to Paul (!) Schliemann, and illustrate what happens when Platonic authorial guidance escapes the notice of much ancient and new[45] "secondary audience,"[46] yielding to the mystic documentation of the mythic island.

Hanno's *periplus* resists exact exploration: Was there ever an authentic colonization and/or travel report by a Carthaginian wo*man? Was there ever an intended audience that should understand this text (or versions of it) "scientifically"? The communicational signs of the work shown by a very chairman of antique *mouvance* texts, Jonathan Burgess (book discovery, hypertension of number and landscape, the somewhat gory testimonial of gorilla skins in Cronus's sanctuary) do not recommend this reading, however. But: which contracts about fictionality exist in texts of a paradoxographic nature? Which "recipients" signed on to them? And what about the *Tiefendiskurs* of the *imaginaire*, audible throughout with Hanno?

In any case, on the trail of a fascinating "deep discourse" is Nicoletta Momigliano: she opens the literary stage of the archaeological novel in the first half of the twentieth century, full of Minoan fake and "counterfake" protagonists, and asks – and thus answers – the role played by the wavering perception of Sir Arthur Evans's sometimes fictional "reconstitution" of Minoan reality in fictional creation: re*al*ter*ity. Once again, there is no question that, as Burgess puts it, "various circumstances raise issues of authenticity, and … *all of them are interesting*"![47]

Not a few so called fakes and forgeries turn out to be "alienations" of a former common *Zeichenfeld*: here, the "intimate group"[48] once enjoyed their "weak reading,"[49] but naive later recipients left it innocently or ignored it blameworthily. With *The Rhetoric of the Roman Fake* (2012), Irene Peirano, in the opinion of many, made plausible that certain fakes, some of which were hardly convicted costing a lot of philological sweat, in fact do *not* deceive their addressees, who

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[44] Cf., by the way, Hanno's "bay surrounding an island that contains a lake in which exists another island" (Peripl. 14. 18: cf. Jonathan Burgess, *infra*).

[45] Cf. the various Atlantis sites on the net, to which Heinz-Günther Nesselrath refers, *infra*.

[46] Plato, tongue in cheek, spreads *veritatis splendor*: the core of the λόγος μάλα μὲν ἄτοπος, παντάπασί γε μὴν ἀληθής Crit. 23c-e reminds so much of the panegyrics of ἐπιτάφιοι λόγοι, that naïve Athenian minds, ἀκροώμενοι καὶ κηλούμενοι (cf. Plat. Menex. 235b1), should take it at face value.

[47] Cf. *supra* n. 13.

[48] I'm using, quite loosely, terms of Maletzke 1963 ("Intimgruppe").

[49] Cf. the term in Morrison 2013, 309.

participated in "sophisticated, ironic reading" (provided they did so).[50] Such a reading is presented by John Henderson – himself a master of sophisticated *writing*! – on the late antique *Oratio pridie quam in exilium iret*: {Cicero} "makes himself say that he's saying that he's silent". Hypertension, accompanied by hyper-referentiality, indeed: This Cicero forces his students (and, thanks to Henderson, us readers, too!) with his "detonating metatextuality" to bring forth every single personal "memory" of the alter ego's œuvre.

At John Henderson's side there is Jared Hudson, re*discovering the pseudo-Sallustian *Invectiva in Ciceronem* as a "challenge," as a metatext, as "an experimental study in the written performance of rhetoric," "not a speech, but performative speechwriting." *Tant pis* for the honest Quintilians that they were not up to such a trick, "much too intricate, too conceptual to have meant to impersonate Sallust (or Cicero) for real"!

With Peter Keegan, we visit an "information container" *in situ*: expert on Pompeian graffiti, he shows that next to, above and instead of the honest "privacy" of such communication, strongly suggested at first glance by the type of information, material, and location, there lurks its "true," *representative* dimension: the *Zeichenfeld* is the specifically urban milieu with its various spatial and sociocultural entanglements producing shared "scripts" of communication processes, "a specific sequence of perception, evaluation, and response".

Many of the texts examined by Keegan are anonymous. Should we learn to understand anonymity[51] as an appropriate, unforced, even *wanted* advantage of discourse, as an "opening" of interpretation into the less limited, the general realm?[52] Diego De Brasi takes a surprising look at the anonymous {Theocr.} 19 and acknowledges "an increase in the impact of a text by making him 'universal'", by explaining its impressive effect in antiquity (Anacreont. 35!) as applied to the juxtaposition, unencumbered by any authorship, with Moschus's *Amor fugitivus*. Enjoy, lector benevole, the aesthetic value of this fine, little poem, free of any verdict on a "pseudo-X"![53]

Without intact communicative signs, there is no hermeneutic community. Exactly this fact, perhaps, might be the root cause of all indignation and disregard for fakes and forgeries: they are *asocial*, they hurt community, on which rests all successful communication, and ultimately human *oikeiosis*. This form of intended

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[50] But where do we draw which boundaries? Are we about to replace "All crimes" with "All's fine," and force our modern, intertextual, ironic thinking on antiquity? Eco 1992, 610 reminds us that the Constantinian forgery might originally have been created without *dolus malus*.

[51] On anonymity see also Martínez 2018.

[52] Cf. Geue 2019; "so far as words are creative, a signature merely distracts us from their true significance" (Edward Morgan Forster), cit. as a motto by Geue 2019.

[53] Cf. Richard Hunter's recommendation of {Theocr.} 23 (Hunter 2002).

disinformation means hermeneutic usurpation, the sender introducing false *stimuli*, preparing, in a sense, a "queer container" (πλαγιάζω "deceive"). Giuseppe La Bua focuses on the flowing borders, when he recognizes the *imitatio* and *aemulatio* of the early imperial connoisseur literary scene as "potential forgery" (!): as many statements by the younger Pliny show, here, all formal conditions of "genuine forgery" are fulfilled – but still the almost "begged" recognition by the peer group reader elevates the *Fast-Autor* to a real authority.

In the context of religious texts, *mechanical* disinformation, the *Schreiberfehler*, seems the only truly "not guilty" candidate. Esteban Calderón Dorda makes us smile at first about a particularly grotesque *Balhorn*, one Dadaist variant of the ancestors of Jesus in Luke 3:23–38 in Ms. 109 (s. xiv).[54] But already the *contaminazione a distanza*, "harmonization" or "addition," intervenes in a purposeful manner in the "true" information, combining textures that do not couple originally, but belong to one another in some specific distance from one another. "Blanks" (*Leerstellen*) in every text represent true information: here it is where falsification starts by the creation or reinforcement of references that were not ascertained in the original communicational event.[55] Not to mention the multiple changes in *lectio tradita*, "documenting" the dogmas of the church (or various "heresies"), a profound "asocial" disturbance of communication.

Literature, and so "false literature," too, contains "memorable traces of individual skills, information, and experience."[56] It is true that "every falsification fakes facts that do not correspond to the actual circumstances,"[57] but it helps to recognize the *forma favi*[58] of *both* the perpetrator and the victim: each *falsum* teaches a great deal on the (not only) literary rank and reception of what was falsified. Information, here, begins with traditional philological diacrisis, as carried out by Mikel Labiano in his detailed investigation of the "Athenian decree" within the *Corpus Hippocraticum* and Alessandro Vatri in his falsification of the "Pythagorean pericope" by {Dionysius of Halicarnassus}: The "inscription," as Labiano ascertains on the basis of lexematic, syntactic, and semantic evidence,

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[54] Cf. *mut. mut.* the case of Lucilius in Nonius Marcellus's *De compendiosa doctrina*: Here, the misunderstanding of the right-to-left instead of left-to-right excerpts led the interpreters before Lindsay to astonishing reconstructions.

[55] 2 Tim 4. 19 (cf. *infra*, n. 61) is emblematic. In two codices Lektra, Simmias and Zenon, wife and children of Onesiphorus, are interpolated in the "blank" of Paul's (?) letter from the acts of Paul and Thekla: this adjustment to the pseudo-information of the apocryphal, which is typically characterized by its treacherous abundance of detail (hypertension!), leads to disinformation on *both texts*.

[56] Peter Keegan, *infra*.

[57] Speyer 1971, 3.

[58] Cf. Phaedr. 3. 13. 10–11: in – *forma* – tion!

belongs to an accomplished Atticist of the early imperial period who met the corpus in its final stages and, more precisely "completed" the pseudo-Hippocratic correspondence on the Athenian plague ("a fiction that supports another fiction")[59] with his pseudotestimonial (!) decree.[60] By doing this, he not only teaches us to recognize the *forma favi* of authentic decrees more precisely, but also puts a spotlight on the reception of Hippocrates and even more glaring light on his own cultural performance.

Alessandro Vatri, by means of scrupulous word analysis, acquits Dionysius of Halicarnassus of the impression that, in *De imitatione*, he had not recognized Pythagorean scripts as pseudepigraphs – or worse: recommended them for imitation *veritate posthabita*. As a result of this acquittal, we gain eloquent testimony to the renaissance of Hellenistic *pseudopythagorea* and, thanks to the concise formulation of the interpolation, learn a lot about their moral and aesthetic motives.

Bronwen Neil, displaying her no small authority on Christian epistolography, underlines the true information value of the false letter CA 71 of {Felix III} and its annex of seven letters of support: only through such fine PR of *pseudo*-Felix, we *know* the intensity of the epichoric support of the Roman Church against Petrus Fullo. Neil, starting with the *Deuteropaulinen*, gives us an insight into the different types of "hybridization" of such corpora. In the early Church these collections swelled, powered by the "community effect" of early parishes, whereas in later centuries exorcism (or promulgation) of heretical arguments played a major role: the recourse to an authority who makes the argument run better, the "auratic charge,"[61] always remains the same.

Such "auratic charge" of Athanasius († 373) was helpful to (and was helped by) followers of Luciferus of Cagliari († 371), who wrote two "Athanasian" letters (50, 51) in the late 380s, eager to confirm their – not really – extremist Nicene group. Colin M. Whiting explains in whose real interest the "paragon of orthodoxy and a source of immense authority" asks for, receives, and, *"cum per omnia ex integro ageret,"* praises beyond measure (!; see n. 43) writings from a (not so) "borderline figure." These letters are examples of the contemporary "personalization" of Orthodoxy and show an in*famous exploitation of current "containers," the lively correspondence of the episcopal peers (contrast the "discursive

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[59] See also {D.H.} writing on {Pyth.}: Alessandro Vatri's contribution, *infra*.

[60] Maybe he felt influenced by the "documents" of the *Corpus Demosthenicum*, being finalized at that time? In any case, both are typical fillings of gaps (see *supra*).

[61] The term is Reulecke's (2016, 125). The close proximity to the personal aura of someone significant increases the rank and verifiability of what is communicated. In this sense there is a strange relationship between a letter carrier ({Athan.} epist. 50, 2: Whiting, *infra*), a cloak (2 Tim 4. 13) and a rooster (Plat. Phaed. 118a7).

discrepancy" to which Salvian refers, see n. 41); all this for one's own – or heaven's, indeed? – sake.

This is where, in terms of communication theory, this important point comes into view once again: *trust*.[62] If a message aims to be received "genuinely," we have to trust the *whole* "container." Even with the most "objective" genre, with modern scientific data, acceptance of the content depends heavily on recipient's trust in the sender.[63] Even more with "intimistic" information (which is why letters and similar intimate statements most often become the object of counterfeiting) when it is exactly the very *individual* sight and personal access to any ongoing material that makes *the central vector of information*, (often hypertrophic) fake-"rhetorics of authenticity" (Ruthven), fake-"effets de réel" (Roland Barthes) dishonestly seduce the trust of the reader.[64] Here, "foreign" proximity becomes, seen from an "ontic" point of view, communicative *distance*. José Ignacio González de Aspuru deals with the notorious will of Antony, which Octavian had read out in the senate and *contio* after Antony's divorce from Octavia. None of the facts were wrong as such: but the "container" was wrong: data from other contexts were "communicated" as *testamentary* information. Propaganda success proved the forger (!) "right" – not before the judgement seat of posterity. To whom, now or then, this tricky deception was laid bare, Augustus offers an all the more prosaic picture of a regime based on repression and fiction(ers).

And finally (or at the beginning of all?): What is the good of the long-born, painstakingly raised, exaggeratedly pampered and almost rejected child of the human spirit, the historical-philological method? It is, for which we stand,[65] the appropriate means of providing the *epicrisis* on the *Genre(!)sternchen* of dis*information, isn't it? Mario Capasso's contribution on the feuds of the Hellenistic schools of philosophy and two attempts to defame Epicurus through forged letters or incorrect attribution shows the exact philology of Zeno of Sidon (second century BC) as the unbreakable basis for understanding of verified, authentic information. Note: philology *triumphans*, providing the conclusive arguments to expose a *falsum* in front of the *heliaia* (if not leading the forger to the scaffold (or *barathrum*), a fact which Capasso – philologically of course! – clarifies and which we will, after all, hear with pleasure).

So, all's well that ends well? But what if Ignacio Rodriguez Temiño and Ana Yáñez give us an impressive account of the Iruña-Veleia case, "the greatest forgery of archaeological artefacts in Spain since … the second half of the nineteenth

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[62] On credibility as an essential factor in communication see Maletzke 1963, 127–132.
[63] O'Connor / Weatherall 2019, 71–75.
[64] *Contra* Metzger 1980, 20.
[65] "Textual criticism aims at discovering the phylogeny of error" (Martínez 2012, 9).

century", and report on the sudden rise and fall of a *Zeichenfeld* and the desperate attempts to save it over, for ideological reasons, into the blogosphere? What if, in the verdict 44/2020 (June 8, 2020) of the Criminal Court No. 1 of Vitoria-Gasteiz, the fact that "three converging lines" on Jesus' cross, meaning the forged inscription *RIP* and thus unequivocally bringing to light the naivety of the manufacturer – what if this triumph, won by an army of epigraphic and philological experts, gets dunked in the semi-darkness of "mere conjecture and contradictory opinions by different experts"? Then *requiescas in pace, Philologia!*

    Fabula docet: the *falsum* does not simply make the great, annoying stone before the door of the truth (otherwise this here would really be a "council of antiquarians and paleographers"):[66] *nihil habet solidum. tenue est mendacium – perlucet si diligenter inspexeris* (Sen. epist. 79. 18):[67] The *falsum* makes a delicate, fine tissue. It allows the *verum* to shine through, in nuances and reliefs that were less noticeable without its counterpart, really tied at the head. And, treated differ*entiated*ly, it becomes even itself *perlucidum*, shines out with "hidden values." *Mundus vult decipi*? *Mundus vult percipi*!

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[66] ("Konzil der Antiquare und Paläografen*"*): Adolf v. Harnack on the Third Council of Constantinople 680/1 AD: Speyer 1969, 253; Martínez 2018, 411.

[67] Any resemblance to the intentional sense of Sen. epist. 79, 18 is purely coincidental.

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